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Only a month after the outbreak of pneumonia caused by 2019-nCoV, more than forty-thousand people
were infected. This put enormous pressure on the Chinese government, medical healthcare provider, and
the general public, but also made the international community deeply nervous. On the 25th day after the
outbreak, the Chinese government implemented strict traffic restrictions on the area where the 2019-
nCoV had originateddHubei province, whose capital city is Wuhan. Ten days later, the rate of increase
of cases in Hubei showed a significant difference (p ¼ 0.0001) compared with the total rate of increase in
other provinces of China. These preliminary data suggest the effectiveness of a traffic restriction policy
for this pandemic thus far. At the same time, solid financial support and improved research ability, along
with network communication technology, also greatly facilitated the application of epidemic prevention
measures. These measures were motivated by the need to provide effective treatment of patients, and
involved consultation with three major groups in policy formulationdpublic health experts, the gov-
ernment, and the general public. It was also aided by media and information technology, as well as
international cooperation. This experience will provide China and other countries with valuable lessons
for quickly coordinating and coping with future public health emergencies.
© 2020 Institut Pasteur. Published by Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.Human history is littered with wars and pandemics, but the
death and fear caused by some pandemics cannot be matched by
any war. The one with the largest number of deaths in recent hu-
man history, the Spanish flu caused by the H1N1 influenza A virus,
had infected 500 million people (almost 1/3 of the world popula-
tion in 1918 [1]) and killed 25 to 50 million people [2,3]. In the 21st
century, human epidemics caused by viruses have continuously
appeared in the public eye. Among them, the new infectious dis-
eases caused bywild animal coronavirus infections in humans have
attracted the most attention, reminding us that people should bedical Department, Affiliated
University, No. 78, Heng Zhi
a.
angdong Haid Group Co., Ltd,
ina.
genp@163.com (C. Pan).
vier Masson SAS. All rights reservefully prepared to respond to a larger pandemic that may occur at
any time in the future.
Coronaviruses of wild animal origin have caused 3 serious hu-
man infectious diseases in less than 20 years. The first infectious
disease was reported in November 2002, in Guangdong Province,
China [4]. While the source of the virus was not identified yet, this
disease spread quickly, infecting many medical staff. On February
21, 2003, an infected Guangdong doctor travelled to Hong Kong,
leading to spread of the virus globally [5]. Not until March 15, after
the World Health Organization (WHO) received reports of cases
from Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Hanoi, was a global alert on the
disease issued, which was officially named “Severe Acute Respira-
tory Syndrome (SARS)" [6]. The pathogen originated from bats [7]
and the intermediate host was the masked palm civet [8]. At the
beginning of the epidemic, the international community lacked
experience for containment of this type of outbreak, and the dis-
ease was not officially diagnosed until 146 days after the first cased.
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established a comprehensive prevention network, allocated 2
billion yuan to epidemic prevention, built a “Xiaotangshan” tem-
porary hospital, and actively treated patients. Because of the low
coverage by modern communication networks, there was difficulty
in communicating information. Nevertheless, the epidemic
response was generally satisfactory [10]. Although interpersonal
transmission of the first SARS outbreak (November 2002 to July
2003) was successfully stopped thanks to global cooperation [11],
the worldwide spread of the SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) still
caused 8447 cases and 774 deaths in 32 countries [12].
The second infectious disease was Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome caused byMERS-CoV in 2012. It occurred in Saudi Arabia
and spread to other countries including the United States, England,
France, and South Korea. The mortality rate was as high as 34.4%. As
of the end of November 2019, a total of 2468 people had been
infected worldwide [13]. According to research results, this coro-
navirus originated from bats and was transmitted to humans
through an intermediate host, the camel [14,15].
In 2019, a new type of coronavirus, which is highly homologous
to bat coronavirus, hit China again [16,17]. At the end of December,
some hospitals in Wuhan reported several cases of unexplained
pneumonia in those with a history of South China seafood market
exposure [18,19]. In December 31 the pneumonia cases of unknown
origin were officially reported; in early January 2020, market store
owners were evacuated in succession; and Hubei Province began to
investigate the source of the virus. However, after only two weeks,
the number of mysterious pneumonia cases nationwide had
reached 198 by January 18, then reaching 830 by January 23 [20],
and Wuhan immediately began implementing traffic control to
prevent the spread of the disease. The “Level 1 Emergency
Response to major public health emergencies” was implemented,
and comprehensive epidemic prevention began. One week later
(January 30), the official reported number of confirmed domestic
cases had reached 9,692, which exceeded the total number of
previous cases of SARS in the world [21]. On the same day, WHO
announced that 2019-nCOV constitutes a Public Health Emergency
of International Concern (PHEIC) [22], which noted that this elusive
disease is more dangerous than the one in 2003. The Chinese
government also made a series of significant responses in a very
short period of time, including the establishment of a leading group
of experts for epidemic response [23], the construction of a number
of temporary hospitals [24e26], the deployment of medical staff
[27], and the implementation of a comprehensive national
epidemic prevention policy [28]. It remains to be seen whether
these measures can quickly control the spread of 2019-nCOV.
The major outbreaks caused by the spread of wild animal vi-
ruses across the species barrier have raised important questions for
human society. How do we learn from the experience of China and
the international community in responding to the outbreak? What
preparations can human society make in advance of pandemics,
when faced with a potentially more dangerous pandemic in the
future? This article presents the actions taken by the government,
experts and international parties in response to the two outbreaks
caused by SARS-CoV and 2019-nCoV, and analyzes possible pre-
ventive measures in future epidemics through a relationship
diagram.
1. 2020 in crisis
Although the 2019-nCOV epidemic broke out rapidly in early
2020, the Chinese government and experts have responded much
faster than they did to the SARS outbreak e relying on 17 years of
technical and economic experience e and various measures were
therefore consecutively carried out.As shown in Fig. 1A, the challenges brought to us by the two
epidemics are quite different. By January 30, 2020, the cumulative
number of 2019-nCoV cases in China had exceeded the total
number of previous SARS cases worldwide [29], and many new
cases appeared in only one month. Currently, there are still more
than 3000 new confirmed cases of 2019-nCoV infection daily. As of
the date of this publication, the total number of confirmed do-
mestic cases has risen to 78064 [30]. During this period, the diag-
nosis, isolation, admission and treatment of patients have become
the biggest challenges that China and the international community
need to face. It is reassuring that the vast majority of cases of 2019-
nCOV are still concentrated in China, and the number of trans-
mitting countries and regions is currently 28 (Fig.1B), slightly lower
than the number of countries that reported SARS cases [12,31]. In
addition, no deaths have been reported in any country outside of
China, except for the death of a pneumonia patient in the
Philippines [32] (as of February 9, 2020). Since 2019-nCOV has an
incubation period of 5.3e19 days (average of 5.2 days) [33], the
effects of international traffic control measures in 2020 need to be
further observed.
Meanwhile, the Chinese government is actively responding to
the outbreak (Fig.1C). On January 24, considering the rapid increase
in the number of cases, China began to build several temporary
hospitals, including “Huoshenshan” and “Leishenshan”, in many
cities of the country. Huoshenshan Hospital was successfully con-
structed at an astonishing speed, and started to receive patients
within ten days [25]. On January 26, the Chinese government
invested 11.21 billion RMB; after 11 days [34], the investment
increased to 66.74 billion RMB [35] in epidemic prevention and
control funds, and has deployed more than 10,000 medical staff
nationwide to assist Hubei Province [27]. Back in 2003, China built
the Xiaotangshan Temporary Hospital in 6 days [36], with its con-
struction starting as late as 158 days after the first case was re-
ported, indicating that the response to the spread of SARS-CoV was
far slower than for 2019-nCoV. Similarly, in the current epidemic,
China implemented main domestic response measures before
WHO’s announcement of the high risk of a global epidemic; while
during SARS, China’s establishment of temporary hospitals and
financial support came after WHO’s warning.
The government’s rapid response to the epidemic has benefited
in part from the substantial improvement of the national scientific
research ability and research equipment, as well as the efficient
communication of research results. As shown in Fig. 1D, the disease
caused by 2019-nCOV was diagnosed 8 days after the first cases
appeared [37], the entire virus gene sequence was obtained on the
11th day, the virus nucleic acid diagnostic technology was estab-
lished on the 14th day [38e40], the live virus was isolated on the
25th day [41], and the study on the intermediate host was reported
on the 39th day [68]. In contrast, the SARS virus was isolated in 125
days [43], the disease was formally diagnosed in 146 days [9], a
virus nucleic acid diagnostic method was established in 151 days
[44,45], and the full gene sequence of the virus was obtained in 160
days [46]. As noted in Fig. 1C, during the 2019-nCoV epidemic, most
of the government’s major epidemic prevention measures were
also implemented quickly after the disease was diagnosed.
The rapid increase in the number of 2019-nCoV cases in a short
period of time has forced society to respond quickly. At present,
2019-nCOV is still spreading rapidly, and the origin of the new vi-
rus, transmission modes other than saliva droplets and airborne
transmission, the window period, the contagious period after
clinical recovery, and patient prognosis are unknown e but the
efforts of all parties have begun to bear fruit. In particular, it should
be noted that on January 24, 2020, Hubei Province launched the
most stringent anti-epidemic traffic control measures in human
history, as measured in the number of human individuals affected.
Fig. 1. The major progress of research and government measures during the SARS-CoV and 2019-nCoV epidemics. A. The rate of increase in cases during the SARS-CoV and 2019-
nCoV outbreaks; B. The increase in number of countries that had cases of infection during the outbreak; C. Government measures; D. Major progress of research. The dotted line in A
means that the data are unavailable, the numbers in the brackets in C and D represent the number of days after the first reported case.
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control [47]. On the second day, other cities in Hubei have also
announced measures for epidemic prevention traffic control [48],
and rail, high-speed and ordinary road traffic within the jurisdic-
tion of the above-mentioned cities have been suspended to varying
degrees, and public transportation such as buses and long-distance
passenger transport within the jurisdiction of the city have also
been suspended. The control measures appeared to take effect
within two days: the case increase rate in other provinces across
the country began to be significantly slower than the case increaseFig. 2. The effect on the increasing rate of cases with strict travel restrictions. Red
arrow indicates the date after which Wuhan was under strict travel restriction. It was
the first time in human history that the gates of a city with a population of about 9
million were almost totally closed by a virus. The data on day 19 were unavailable. The
number of cases in Hubei increased much faster than in other provinces after the travel
restrictions were imposed.rate in Hubei Province, as shown in Fig. 2. Compared with the case
number in Hubei Province, the increase in case numbers in other
provinces became significantly slower (p ¼ 0.0001).
This measure established a barrier between the source of
infection and healthy uninfected people, in order to block the
transmission of the new coronavirus. Although the number of
confirmed new cases is still a cause of worry, one can imagine what
would have happened if such measures had not been implemented
on January 23 or the country had not taken relevant epidemic
prevention measures: given the transmission characteristics of
2019-nCOV in China, it is likely that therewould have beenmultiple
“Wuhans” by now, and the number of confirmed diagnoses would
have been much larger than currently observed. Comparing do-
mestic air passenger traffic data in 2002 and 2018 (the normal
passenger traffic in the year before the current outbreak), the na-
tional passenger volume in 2018 was 7 times larger than in 2002
[49,50]. One can thus estimate how quickly the new coronavirus
would have been transmitted if drastic traffic control measures had
not been implemented.2. Social cooperation during the 2019-nCoV epidemic and
lessons for future epidemic prevention
With the increase of the world’s population, improvements and
ease of transportation, and the increase of human traffic, the threat
of epidemics on human beings is constantly increasing. In addition,
despite the unpredictability of each epidemic, the process of bat-
tling previous epidemics has brought with it valuable experience
for responding to future epidemics. The 2019-nCOV epidemic has
challenged the limits of our ability to handle it. As a viral infectious
disease that can be transmitted through multiple channels, its
onset time also coincided with the Spring Festival (the biggest
national holiday in China), when over a billion people begin their
annual migration in China. The outbreak also originated in themain
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populations are dense.
At early stages of the outbreak, Hubei Province had experienced
a shortage of personal protection materials, such as masks and
hospital supplies. Thus, it began to collect materials from other
parts of the country and urgently transferred them to Hubei
Province. As of February 6, 2020, there was still shortage of mate-
rials in the province [51]; this is a wake-up call for us when dealing
with future outbreaks. As shown in Fig. 3, during a public health
emergency, the smooth coordination between the government,
medical care and the masses is very important. For example, on
February 3, when the number of confirmed cases in Wuhan had
reached 6384 [52] and there was a shortage of medical resources,
the government promptly claimed stadiums, exhibition halls and
other places to establish a number of “square cabin hospitals” for
treating non-critical patients. This was done to free up important
resources at Huoshenshan Hospital, Leishenshan Hospital and
other sites to treat critically ill patients in a more timely manner
[53]. The public was promptly guided by governments at all levels
in order to maximally prevent the spread of the virus.
At the same time, cooperation within the medical system en-
ables scientific research results to be used in clinical diagnosis and
treatment in a timely manner, and serves as the scientific basis for
the government’s response. In addition, prompt communication
between international governments served to prevent the spread
of the virus worldwide. As of February 9, 2020, 40,171 cases were
diagnosed globally, and only 307 cases were found in countries and
regions other than China, accounting for 0.76% of the total [54].
Certainly, media and information technology provided impor-
tant support for societies during the 2019-nCOV epidemic (Fig. 3).
At the beginning of 2019, the number of Chinese internet users had
reached 829million, of which 817million aremobile Internet users,
covering almost every corner of the countryside [55]. Back in 2003,
there were about 80 million Chinese internet users, mostly
concentrated in urban areas [56]; moreover, 63.91% of China’s
populationwas rural [57]. In 2003, television and other media wereFig. 3. Interactions in society during the 2019-nCoV pandemic. The arrows represent the
interactions. Information technology (labelled as green) influences all of the subjects, drama
of the public.the main communication channels for epidemic prevention infor-
mation. In 2019, however, real-time information of the 2019-nCOV
epidemic was transmitted in real-time through various channels
throughout the country, like WeChat and Weibo like apps. This
technology also allows any traveler to check the trend of population
flow and exposure to pneumonia patients during their trip at any
time. These technologies have greatly facilitated accurate epidemic
prevention and control [58].
After the epidemic broke out, the Chinese government adopted
a big data platform for epidemic prevention and control d“Close
Contact Meter” [59]don February 8th. By uploading and
comparing national health data, it is possible to automatically
identify past contacts and potential contacts. The comparison and
calculation of the resultant data model provides relative risk co-
efficients for people, so that the government can carry out precise
measures. At the same time, China Unicom formed a joint big data
team of more than 100 people, provided the government with 1783
comprehensive epidemic analysis reports and developed 13 data
models for epidemic prevention [60]. In addition, e-commerce
companies including Alibaba and JD.com donated funds along with
a large amount of medical supplies during the epidemic [61], using
their industry advantages and logistics to facilitate large-scale
material delivery. This level of development in e-commerce can
fully overcome logistical obstacles that do not involve direct contact
between people, to prevent further viral transmission [62].
Learning from the effective measures used and problems
encountered in the prevention and control of this epidemic, the
government is likely to set up an emergency decision-making or-
ganization when responding to future public health emergencies.
Externally, the government needs to guide medical and scientific
research and allocate medical care materials, and at the same time,
comprehensive epidemic prevention must be implemented rapidly
and efficiently. Concurrently, the government also needs to regu-
larly disclose information and ensure international cooperation. For
the general population, it is difficult to realize the limitations of
government measures and medical care to deal with an emerginginteractions between the subjects; the broader arrows indicate the more prominent
tically improving the process of virus identification, new drug screening, and daily care
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excessive public support and high expectations may turn into
disappointment and propagation of rumors [63]. Patients and un-
infected people in both epidemic and non-epidemic areas (Fig. 3)
also face different levels of psychological pressure, which also need
to be addressed.
Scientific achievements such as development of vaccines, anti-
bodies and antiviral drugs play an important role in fighting epi-
demics and reducing mortality. Integrating scientific research
resources, increasing research investment, strengthening direct
cooperation between international and domestic scientists, and
accelerating clinical applications of scientific research results en-
hances the ability to prevent spread of the epidemic or accelerate
elimination of the virus.
In summary, in the 2019-nCoV epidemic, the overall response of
China and the international community is faster than it was for
SARS-CoV. These responses include disease diagnosis, virus isola-
tion, financial support, and temporary hospital construction. To
deal with the increasing growth of cases, the Chinese government
has adopted comprehensive traffic restrictions in the areas where
the epidemic originated. After implementation of the traffic re-
strictions, the rate of infection in the original outbreak areas and
the rest of the country showed a significant difference.
How tofight pandemicswill always be amajor issue that needs to
be addressed worldwide. In 2003, the SARS incident caused global
economic losses of US$ 30 billion [64], which exceeded the military
expenditures of any one of 221 countries in 2018 [65]. At present we
do not have a clear prediction of the funds that would be required to
confront a future global pandemic, but it is safe to assume that, in
many cases, it would cost much less than the losses caused by the
disease [66,67]. Making advance preparations for a pandemic may
bring us significant short-term benefits, such as supporting basic
health care, encouraging research and development, strengthening
interregional cooperation and emergency response systems and
biosafetymanagement, andpromoting the balanced development of
health and security of the world in general.
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